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ABSTRACT
The lockdowns and travel restrictions in current coronavirus pan-
demic situation has replaced face-to-face teaching and meeting with
online teaching and meeting. Recently, the video conferencing tool
Zoom has become extremely popular for its simple-to-use feature
and low network bandwith requirement. However, Zoom has seri-
ous security and privacy issues. Due to weak authentication mecha-
nisms, unauthorized persons are invading Zoom sessions and creat-
ing disturbances (known as Zoom bombing). In this paper, we pro-
pose a preliminary work towards a seamless authentication mecha-
nism for Zoom-based teaching and meeting. Our method is based on
PRNU (Photo Response Non Uniformity)-based camera authentica-
tion, which can authenticate the camera of a device used in a Zoom
meeting without requiring any assistance from the participants (e.g.,
needing the participant to provide biometric). Results from a small-
scale experiment validates the proposed method.
Index Terms— Oneline meeting and teaching, Video confer-
encing, PRNU-based source camera attribution.
1. INTRODUCTION
The current coronavirus (covid-19) pandemic situation has brought a
lot of changes in how teaching and meeting are happening around the
world. Due to lockdowns and travel restrictions, regular face-to-face
teaching (classroom teaching) and face-to-face meeting are being re-
placed with video conference-based online teaching and meeting.
Recently, the video conferencing tool Zoom1 has become extremely
popular for its simple-to-use feature and low network bandwidth re-
quirement, resulting so-called Zoom booming [1].
However, as has been reported by many media houses and ac-
knowledged by Zoom, Zoom has serious security and privacy is-
sues [2]. For lowering the network bandwidth and network latency
requirements, Zoom does not use end-to-end encryption (as encryp-
tion introduces extra overheads). Although a password-based au-
thentication mechanism has been provided, the use of password is
also optional for making Zoom more user-friendly. The password
setting is also not provided in the default Zoom setup. As a result,
many Zoom sessions are password-less. Some Zoom sessions are at-
tended by an unauthorized persons, leading to Zoom bombing (teach-
ers being racially abused and students being shown pornographic
videos), and Zoom eavesdropping (confidential conversation being
secretly heard) issues [3, 4].
A combination of Zoom features can be used for addressing the
security and privacy issues in some extent [5]. Besides using the
password, the wait room feature can be used by the teacher or the
1https://zoom.us/
meeting host for accepting or rejecting joining requests from stu-
dents or meeting participants [6]. Although this feature can be useful
in controlling a small classroom or meeting, for a bigger classroom
or meeting (where hundreds of participant can join), this feature can
also fail. It could be near impossible for the teacher or the meet-
ing host for remembering hundreds of names and online identities
of students and meeting participants. This solution also can create a
lot of hassle as some of the joining requests can be attended in-the-
middle of the Zoom session. Besides the wait room feature, other
guidelines, such as not to share the meeting links in public domain,
sharing the meeting links just before the start of the meeting and not
using recurring meeting options, and controlling the screen share op-
tion etc. can be used. None of them, however, can provide full-proof
defense against a savvy attacker (e.g., a hacker).
By taking Zoom as an example, in this paper, we present a pre-
liminary work towards a scalable, automatic, and hassle-free authen-
tication scheme for video-conferencing-based online meeting and
teaching. The proposed scheme combines PRNU [7] (Photo Re-
sponse Non-Uniformity)-based authentication with password-based
authentication. The PRNU-based authentication can seamlessly au-
thenticate a meeting participant (or a student) by authenticating the
camera of the device she uses in the meeting (or online classroom).
In such cases, the meeting participant enjoys the same usability that
she enjoys with default zoom setup (no password to remember, no
keys to press, no bio-metric required). Whenever the PRNU-based
scheme cannot authenticate, the participant is asked to enter the pass-
word. The proposed scheme was experimentally validated by vali-
dating the effectiveness of the PRNU-based method for the webcams
of desktops, and selfie-camera of mobile phones and tablets (as these
cameras are typically used in Zoom sessions). The experiment with
a set of 10 cameras shows promising result.
The rest of the paper has been organized as follows. Section 2
presents related work and provides an overview of how Zoom works.
In Section 3, we discuss the proposed method. Section 4 presents
experimental result. Finally, Section 5 concludes and also discusses
how we intend to extend this paper.
In the rest of the paper, we will use the term Zoom meeting in
the place of Zoom-based meeting or Zoom-based teaching.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
2.1. Video Conferencing Using Zoom
Zoom is arguably one of the most popular video conferencing tool
now. One of the main reasons for this popularity is Zoom’s easy-
to-use feature. For joining an online meeting room, the participant
does not need to go with the hassle of registering into Zoom. Only
a meeting ID (which is a multi-digit number) is enough. By default,
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Fig. 1: Threat Model.
Fig. 2: Camera attribution using two videos.
Zoom does not authenticate a participant. This leads to a number of
security and privacy issues, such as authentication issue.
Figure 1 shows how authentication threat can happen for a Zoom
meeting with default meeting setup. It is assumed that the Attacker
can know the meeting ID. This is a safe assumption as people are
sharing meeting IDs in public forum (e.g., social media). It is also
assumed that the host and legitimate participants will not often de-
tect that the Attacker has joined. This is also a safe assumption as
the attacker can join in-between the meeting when the host and par-
ticipants are busy. After joining the meeting, the attacker can launch
Zoom bombing and Zoom eavesdropping.
After a series of security issues, Zoom has encouraged to use its
wait room feature. Although this feature can address authentication
issue for a small meeting, authentication is still a concern for a large
meeting. For a large meeting, it would be difficult for the host to
remember the identities of all participants (e.g., hundreds of name).
In such case, it is safe to assume that either the host will not use the
wait room feature or randomly approve connections requests. This
will make the threat model presented in Figure 1 valid.
2.2. PRNU-Based Camera Fingerprinting
The PRNU (Photo Response Non-Uniformity)-based source cam-
era attribution is an effective method for identifying if two differ-
ent videos (or images) belong to the same camera [7–10]. Figure 2
shows how this method works. PRNU-based camera attribution is
based on the fact that the output of the camera sensor, I , can be
modeled as
I = I(0) + I(0)K + ψ (1)
Fig. 3: Camera fingerprint registration. ’User 1’ to ’User N’ are N
legitimate participants.
where I(0) is the noise-free video frame (or an image), K is the
PRNU noise, and ψ is the combination of additional noise, such as
readout noise, dark current, and quantization noise. The multiplica-
tive PRNU noise pattern, K, is unique for each camera and can be
used as a camera fingerprint which enables the attribution of a video
to its source camera. Using a denoising filter F (such as a Wavelet
filter) on a set of video frames of a camera (where it is known that the
video belongs to the camera, physical access to the camera is not re-
quired), we can estimate a known camera fingerprint by first getting
the noise residual, Wk, (i.e., the estimated PRNU) of the kth frame
as Wk = Ik − Iˆ(0)k , Iˆ(0)k = F (Ik), and then averaging the noise
residuals of all the frames. For determining if a specific camera has
taken a given query video, we similarly obtain a query fingerprint
and the match (correlate) this fingerprint with the known fingerprint.
The matching is typically done using Peak-to-Correlation Energy
(PCE) with a matching threshold of 60. If the matching score is
above the threshold, it is concluded that both videos belong to the
same camera. So far, this PRNU method has been used for camera
verification, camera identification, image/video clustering, etc.
The PRNU-based method has also been used for authentication
of users via the camera they use [11, 12]. The existing schemes,
however, have been designed for images. In contrast, our method
considers video. Also, unlike previous schemes, our method com-
bines the PRNU-based method with password.
3. PROPOSED METHOD
The proposed authentication method uses both PRNU-based authen-
tication and password-based authentication for making authentica-
tion process as seamless as possible. First the PRNU-based authenti-
cation is invoked. If a participant is authenticated using this method,
she is allowed to Zoom meeting. Otherwise, the password-based au-
thentication is invoked. If the participant can enter a valid password,
she is also allowed to join the meeting. Otherwise, the participant
is not allowed to the meeting. The PRNU-based authentication is
a truly seamless method. In this method, the participant’s direct in-
volvement is not required as she is not asked to provide her biometric
(e.g., facial expression or fingerprint), or asked to enter a password or
respond to a security question. Rather, participant’s camera (of the
device that the participant uses in Zoom sessions) is authenticated
without prompting her for anything. The PRNU-based method does
Fig. 4: Camera fingerprint matching. ’User 1’ to ’User N’ are N
legitimate participants.
not have 100% true positive rate. Thus a few legitimate participants
will not be authenticated using this method. Theses participants will
only be asked to enter a password.
Our method has two main steps: Camera fingerprint registration
and Camera fingerprint matching.
Figure 3 provides an overview of the fingerprint registration
step. In this step, each legitimate participant of a Zoom meeting
must register the fingerprint of her camera with the meeting host.
This step is done only once before the start of a meeting. For re-
curring meetings, registration is also required once before the start
of the meeting series. This step can be implemented in a number of
ways. A possible way that is more suitable for recurring meetings is
to integrate the registration step in a customized Zoom installation
app. The host will send the installation app to each participants.
During the time of installation, a short video (say, one minute) will
be automatically taken (after taking participant’s permission) using
the camera of the device that is installing the App. Then a camera
fingerprint from the video will be computed using the method de-
scribed in Section 2. The computed fingerprint (e.g., Fingerprint
1.N by Participant N in Figure 3) will be sent to the host. This
way of implementing can perfectly suit online teaching setup, where
the students can be asked by the educational institute to install a
customized Zoom app. Another possible way of implementation is
to ask the participants for sending a short video from their camera
using a secure communication method (such as secure email). The
host can then compute the camera fingerprint of each participant.
Figure 4 provides an overview of the fingerprint matching step.
In this step, the authenticity of each participant is checked. This step
is performed each time a participant wants to join a Zoom meeting.
From initial few seconds of the participant’s video, a camera finger-
print is computed. The camera fingerprint (e.g., Fingerprint 2.N for
Participant N in Figure 4) is then sent to the host. Note that for com-
puting the fingerprint and sending it to the host, no assistance from
the participant is required. For each participant, the host matches
the registered fingerprint with recently obtained fingerprint (for ex-
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Fig. 5: Various Cameras PCE in the first 100 frames of video based
on added Noise of subsequent frames
ample, Fingerprint 1.N is matched with Fingerprint 2.N for Partic-
ipant N). If the match result is above a threshold, the participant is
authenticated, and her Zoom joining request is approved. Otherwise,
the user is asked to enter a password that was setup by the meeting
host. The current version of Zoom allows the meeting host to setup
a password. This password needs to be sent to the participants using
other communication methods (such as email or phone).
4. EXPERIMENTS
Table 1: Run time performance of registration and verification of
various cameras
Camera
Name
Pixels
Size
Register time
I-frames (secs)
Register time
FP (secs)
Verify time
100 frames
First frame
PCE
Huawei honor 8 1280 x 720 1.20 23.84 42.02 178.08
Samsung S9+ 1280 x 720 3.24 23.69 40.19 549.42
Dell Laptop XPS 1280 x 720 1.71 23.21 43.21 368.31
Dell Desktop 1280 x 720 2.26 25.68 43.32 2675.7
HP laptop 1280 x 720 1.94 25.00 44.22 2994.3
Iphone 8 Plus 1920 x 1088 5.00 52.86 95.75 155.41
Dell Laptop XPS 1280 x 720 2.11 25.61 43.20 5075.9
Samsung Note 9 1280 x 720 2.60 25.91 40.59 284.99
Samsung Note 10 1280 x 720 2.02 24.05 41.19 5919.3
Dell Laptop Inspiron 1280 x 720 0.92 10.57 43.06 5340.2
The proposed method is experimentally validated by assessing
the performance of the PRNU-based method for short videos taken
by front cameras of various computing devices (PC, laptop, mobile,
tab). In this small scale-experiment, the goal is to study the feasibil-
ity of the proposed method.
The PRNU-based method (both fingerprint computation and
matching) is implemented in MATLAB on a Windows system hav-
ing 32GB RAM, 3.2GHz CPU. Videos from 10 different computing
devices were used. Table 1 provides the list of computing devices
considered for the experiment. From each computing device, a HD
video (as Zoom uses HD video [13]) is considered. The videos
have not gone through stabilization or out-camera processing (like
scaling, cropping, etc.). For computing the camera fingerprint used
in the registration step, 60 i-frames from a 60 seconds video is used.
For computing the camera fingerprint used in the matching step (i.e.,
query fingerprint), 100 frames (I, P, and B frames) from a shorter 4
seconds video is used. This short video is used as for providing a
smaller delay (due to PRNU matching) for meeting requests. The
PRNU matching is done using PCE with a threshold of 60.
Figure 5 shows the performance of the proposed method. Out of
10 matching, 10 matching were successful (as the obtained PCE is
larger than the threshold 60) by giving a true positive rate of 100%
for this small scale experiment. The achieved true positive rate is by
no means generalisable. A large scale experiment is required to find
the error rates. However, this small scale experiment shows that the
proposed approach works.
Table 1 show the computation cost in computing the query fin-
gerprint and performing matching (Verify time) from 100 frames.
This cost is the main contributor to the run-time delay that a user
needs to bear due to authentication. This table also reports the com-
putation cost required in the registration phase. This cost, however,
is one-time offline cost. Note that, for a smaller video, all the com-
putation costs will be lesser; and for a larger video, these costs will
be higher. This trade-off is due to the fact that a lesser number of
frames will require lesser number of denoising (which is the main
contributor to the delay).
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Zoom-based online meeting has become very popular due to cur-
rent coronavirus scenario. Zoom, however, has serious security and
privacy issues. One of the main security issue is the poor authen-
tication mechanism, due to which an unauthorized person is able to
join a meeting and create disturbances leading to Zoom bombing and
Zoom eavesdropping. In this paper, we have proposed our prelimi-
nary work towards a seamless authentication scheme. The proposed
scheme uses PRNU-based camera authentication method to authen-
ticate a meeting participants. Those who are not authenticated us-
ing this method need to provide a password. A small scale experi-
ment shows that the proposed method works as expected. However,
a number of improvements need to be done for making the method
usable. We have provided some of the possible improvements below.
5.1. Future Work
Large Scale Experiment: A large scale experiment needs to be
done for finding better estimates of error rates (e.g., true positive rate
and false positive rate). Protection against attacks: There can be
a number of attacks. For example, if an attacker collects a video of
a legitimate participant from another source (e.g., social media), she
can impersonate the participant. Techniques need to be developed
for withstanding such attacks. Developing an app: An app imple-
menting the proposed idea needs to be developed. A large scale user
study needs to be conducted by asking users (both computer experts
and non-computer users) to use the app. This study will provide a
better evaluation of the proposed idea in terms of performance, us-
ability, and security.
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